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A COMMON SENSE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
INA’S CRIME-RELATED REMOVAL SYSTEM:
ELIMINATING THE CAVEATS FROM THE
STATUE OF LIBERTY’S WELCOMING WORDS
I. INTRODUCTION
Emma Lazarus’ poem on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty contains no
caveats. Her call to nations engraved below the copper lady states, “Give me
your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free. The
wretched refuse of your teeming shore.”1 The poem’s lack of caveats
ironically reflects the tensions underlying United States immigration policy
today. Each attempt by Congress to clarify and restrict American
immigration laws swallows Lazarus’ welcoming words.2 One of the most
illustrative examples of limits to Lazarus’ broad invitation has been
Congress’s treatment of aliens who have committed crimes.3 Over the past
1. EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883).
2. See id.
3. Aliens who are convicted of crimes are often referred to as “criminal aliens.” See, e.g., Peter
H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367 (1999). As this Note will demonstrate, many of the aliens affected by
congressional reforms to the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) removal provisions can hardly
be considered “criminals.” See infra Part IV.C. See also infra note 9. Although many of the targeted
aliens were convicted of crimes, neither the severity of their offenses, nor their post-conviction
rehabilitation, justify their current stigmatic classification as “criminals.” Consequently, terminology
such as “criminal alien,” which broadly refers to all individuals targeted by Congress’s recent INA
reforms, is misleading. See infra Part IV.C. See also infra notes 9, 47, 59-61 and accompanying text
(discussing the evolution and consequences of the current broad definition of “aggravated felony”
under the INA that characterizes many trivial offenses as grounds for removal). The term “criminal
alien” will be used in this Note to identify only those aliens whom I argue have committed crimes
sufficient to constitute removal (i.e., those whose presence in the United States poses a real social
threat). Limiting the term to aliens who are serious criminal offenders ensures that the classification is
used in the correct context.
The identification of noncitizens as “aliens” is itself significant. For a commentary on the use and
negative implications of characterizing noncitizens as “aliens,” see generally Kevin R. Johnson,
“Aliens” and the United States Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons,
28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (1997). See also Iris Benett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of
Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of “Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1696, 1698 n.7 (1999) (employing the term “immigrant” throughout her Note because of the
“perjorative overtones of the word ‘alien’”).
The term “alien” will be used in this Note because that term is used consistently throughout
immigration law in reference to noncitizens. See INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. IV
1998) (defining an alien as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States”).
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decade, the government’s “tough on crime” position,4 coupled with
xenophobic attitudes,5 has manifested itself in a series of drastic reforms6 to
4. See National Campaign Against Drug Abuse, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1033 (Aug. 1,
1986). To fight the “war on drugs” in the 1980s, the federal government decided to get “tough on
crime.” As a result of polls demonstrating that drugs were the number one problem in the country, see
id. at 1033, law enforcement policy debates focused on drug dealers and narcotics trafficking. Id. at
1038. Various provisions in the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, which targeted aliens
involved in criminal activity, demonstrate the merger of immigration and anti-crime policies. See infra
text accompanying notes 41-44.
The “tough on crime” rhetoric continued through the 1990s. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 37-64
(Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). The Contract with America was a political agenda signed
by GOP Congressional candidates in the fall of 1994, prior to the 1994 midterm elections. See id. at 6.
The “tough on crime” message became a significant part of the Contract. See id. at 37-64. The
introduction to the Taking Back Our Streets Act, as discussed in the Contract, states “[o]ur Contract
with America calls for tough punishment for those who prey on society. For too long, Washington has
refused to get tough— and even when they sound tough, there are always loopholes that favor the
criminal, not the victims.” Id. at 37.
The “tough on crime” agenda continued to target alien criminal activity as well. See Nancy
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
97, 159 (1998) (stating that “the legislative history [of the 1996 reforms] is full of references to aliens
who ‘prey’ on Americans.”). See also 142 CONG. REC. S10,063 (daily ed. May 2, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Byrd) (considering Senate Bill S. 1664, The Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility
Act of 1996, which formulated part of the 1996 immigration reforms, stating “[f]or those individuals
who come to this country and commit crimes— and there are an estimated 450,000 such criminal aliens
in our jails and at large throughout the Nation— there are tough new provisions in this bill that will
keep them off our streets and deport them more quickly.”); Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant,
Immigration Reform: Seeking the Right Reasons, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 883 (1997). In this Article,
Congressman Lamar Smith, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, and
Edward Grant, Counsel to that subcommittee, propose various efforts that should guide general
immigration reform efforts. In support of the 1996 immigration reforms, the authors state that “it is
true that the vast majority of legal immigrants are law-abiding . . . . This does not mean that Congress
has gone overboard, as some suggest, in getting tough on those immigrants who do commit crimes
. . . .” Id. at 936.
5. Nativism greatly contributes to the impact that this “tough on crime” position has on the alien
population in the United States. See Kevin C. Wilson, Recent Development, And Stay Out! The
Dangers of Using Anti-Immigrant Sentiment as a Basis for Social Policy: America Should Take Heed
of Disturbing Lessons from Great Britain’s Past, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 567, 567 (1995) (“In
recent years the United States has experienced a steady rise of anti-immigrant sentiment
. . . .[I]mmigrants have become the unfortunate scapegoats for the ills of American society.”). See also
Smith, supra note 4, at 936 (“[w]hen immigration is accompanied by lawlessness, the American
people suffer through loss of life, health, and property. In addition, when accompanied by crime,
immigration comes to be seen not as a source of pride and renewal for all Americans but as a
contributor to our problems.”); 142 CONG. REC., supra note 4, at S10,063 (speaking of reforming
United States immigration policy in general, Senator Byrd states: “[O]ur Nation must put its own
citizens’ concerns above the laudable goal of helping people from other nations. We must consider our
own national priorities and the needs of our own citizens first.”). It is this distinction between the alien
population and “the American people”— between the citizen and “people from other nations” (i.e.,
“immigrants”)— which perpetuates the notion of removal as an appropriate solution for dealing with
aliens who have committed crimes. However, legal permanent residents who have established
significant roots in the United States blur this distinction. See infra Part IV.A. For more commentary
on the treatment of aliens as “outsiders”, see infra note 140.
6. In 1988, Congress created an entirely new class of deportable aliens by adding the
“aggravated felony” provision to the INA. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/7
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provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)7 that deal with such
aliens.8 As a result of these reforms, the amended statutory provisions reach
far beyond hardened alien criminal offenders and target those who have
committed only minor offenses as well.9 Moreover, although some aliens
may have resided in the United States for decades and may have established
significant roots in this country, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) has the power to remove10 them once they commit any one of a
§ 7347, 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (1988). From 1990-1996, Congress continued to expand the definition of
“aggravated felony” and made numerous other reforms to the INA provisions dealing with the removal
of convicted aliens. See generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Division C of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108
Stat. 4305 (1994); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). See also
infra text accompanying notes 41-54.
7. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537
(Supp. IV 1998)).
8. The “aliens” referred to in this Note are lawful permanent residents (LPRs). See INA
§ 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (Supp. IV 1998) (“‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’
means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United
States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed”).
LPRs are often referred to as “green card” holders. This reference derives from the previously green
document (now pink) that the government provides to LPRs as evidence of their status. STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE L. & POL’Y 1, 99 (2d ed. 1997). LPRs differ from both
nonimmigrants and undocumented aliens. Nonimmigrants, admitted with a nonimmigrant visa, legally
reside in the United States for a temporary period of time. See INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(a)(15) (enumerating the various classes of nonimmigrants, for example, students). See generally
LEGOMSKY, supra, at 223-289. Undocumented aliens are commonly referred to as “illegal aliens.”
These aliens have entered the United States unlawfully or have overstayed their nonimmigrant visas.
LEGOMSKY, supra, at 953.
Nonimmigrants and undocumented aliens are not discussed in this Note. Although nonimmigrants
are subject to the crime-related removal system, this Note focuses only on LPRs, because they have
the most at stake under the current provisions. Additionally, undocumented aliens are not discussed
because their unlawful presence in the United States automatically renders them removable. See INA
§§ 212(a)(6), 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1227(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
9. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) (enumerating the offenses that constitute
“aggravated felonies” for purposes of removal). This broad list, as well as the vague provision dealing
with crimes of moral turpitude, INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), have provided the
INS with the ability to remove many LPRs. State penal codes may classify certain crimes in ways that
invoke the INA removal provisions for trivial crimes. For example, in Oklahoma, if an individual is
convicted for the theft of goods valued at $51.00, and he receives a one-year suspended sentence, he is
deportable. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1731 (West 2000). See also INA §§ 101(a)(43)(G),
101(a)(48)(B), 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G), 1101(a)(48)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In
New York, “two misdemeanor petty theft or public transportation fare evasion charges— turnstile
jumping in the New York City subway system leading to a ‘theft of services’ misdemeanor
conviction,” constitute “crimes of moral turpitude” and can subject an alien to removal. Mojica v.
Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). See also INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). For accounts of the harsh implications of the recent reforms on aliens who have
committed only minor crimes, see infra Part IV.C.
10. In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA)
drastically altered immigration terminology. Prior to IIRAIRA, if the INS determined that an alien was
Washington University Open Scholarship
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number of specified crimes.11 In some instances, the INS can even apply the
provision deeming the aliens removable retroactively,12 and the affected
aliens may not have any opportunities for relief or judicial review. For
example, consider the story of fifty-two year-old Gabriel Delgadillo.13 He is
a Vietnam War veteran and has lived in the United States for thirty-seven
years.14 Although he never applied for naturalization, his wife, seven
children, and parents are all United States citizens.15 In early 1999,
authorities discovered Delgadillo’s 1988 burglary conviction after he applied
for disability benefits from the Veterans Administration.16 Despite
Delgadillo’s veteran status, the duration of his residence, and his family ties
in the United States, the INS removed him to his native Mexico on April 24,
1999.17
To resolve the inconsistency between the current crime-related removal
system18 and Lady Liberty’s welcoming words, Congress faces two options:
it can engrave a long list of exceptions on the back of Lady Liberty’s pedestal
inadmissible at a port of entry, the alien underwent an “exclusion” procedure. See INA § 236, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226 (1994), repealed by IIRAIRA. If the alien had already been admitted to the United States, but
the INS later determined that he was “deportable,” the alien underwent a “deportation” proceeding.
See INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1222(b) (1994), repealed by IIRAIRA. Now, under IIRAIRA, the
proceeding at which an alien’s inadmissibility or deportablity is determined is characterized as a
“removal” proceeding. See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (Supp. IV 1998). See also LEGOMSKY, supra
note 8, at 1, 24, 374. However, Congress still provides separate grounds under which an alien may be
found “inadmissible” or “deportable.” Id. at 24. See, e.g., INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. IV
1998) (enumerating the removal grounds for inadmissable aliens). But see INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1998) (enumerating the removal grounds for aliens who have already been
admitted to the United States and whose criminal activities render them “deportable”).
This Note substitutes the current term “removal” for its predecessor “deportation.” Although
Congress no longer uses the word “deportation” in the INA, it does use the term “deportable”
throughout the statute to characterize admitted aliens who may be removed. See INA § 237(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a) (employing the term “Deportable Aliens” as the section’s title). Therefore, the terms
“removable” and “deportable” are used interchangeably throughout this Note. Moreover, Part IV.B of
this Note uses the term “deportation,” because the Supreme Court cases cited in that section were
decided before the change in terminology in 1996.
11. See INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (enumerating the crime-related removal
grounds). See also INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (enumerating the offenses that constitute
“aggravated felonies” under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
12. See § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). See also infra note 54 and accompanying text.
13. Pamela Hartman, Law Ships Vietnam Vet Back to Mexico- An ‘88 Burglary Forces His
Deportation, TUCSON CITIZEN, Apr. 24, 1999, at 1A.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. For the purposes of this Note, the “crime-related removal system” constitutes all of the
provisions of the INA governing the removal of aliens who have committed crimes. This system
involves the crime-related grounds for removal, discretionary relief available to removable aliens, and
judicial review of both removal orders and denials of discretionary relief. See infra Part III.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/7
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bidding farewell to the numerous aliens adversely affected by the fine print
caveats to Lazarus’ poem, or it could revise the INA so that the removal
provisions impact only those criminal aliens whose presence would actually
jeopardize the safety of United States citizens.19
This Note provides a course of action for Congress should it choose the
latter option. It examines the INA provisions that regulate the removal20 of
aliens who have committed crimes.21 It urges the abandonment of removal as
an acceptable mechanism to solve alien criminal activity and proposes a new
crime-related removal system grounded in flexibility and fairness. This
common sense approach effectuates the removal of only those aliens who are
serious criminal offenders. It accommodates Congress’s intent to deter and
reduce crime, while recognizing that removal is too harsh a consequence for
aliens who have either committed minor criminal offenses, or who have
committed more serious crimes but have established substantial roots in the
United States.
Part II of this Note provides a brief history of the INA crime-related
removal system. Part III provides an overview of the current INA crime-
related removal system, focusing on the criminal grounds for removal, the
types of relief available to some removable aliens, and the statutory bar to
judicial review for most aliens involved in criminal activity.
Part IV analyzes removal as the ultimate fine print caveat to Emma
Lazarus’ poem.22 First, this section briefly assesses the distinction between
citizens and aliens because that distinction serves as the basis for accepting
removal as a mechanism to solve alien criminal activity. Second, it evaluates
the nexus between congressional means and ends in the removal arena. After
considering the justifications for removal, Part IV concludes that the INA’s
crime-related removal system is not sufficiently tailored to accommodate
Congress’s objective of promoting public safety and welfare. Third, it
provides illustrations, like the story of Gabriel Delgadillo,23 which
demonstrate the flaws of the current INA crime-related removal system.
These accounts attempt to “humanize” the problems raised in this Note.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See supra note 10.
21. See, e.g., INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) (Supp. IV 1998) (defining “aggravated
felony”); INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1998) (crime-related grounds for
removal); INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (Supp. IV 1998) (cancellation of removal), INA § 208, 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. IV 1998) (asylum procedure); INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (Supp. IV
1998) (nonrefoulement); INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (Supp. IV 1998) (voluntary departure); INA
§ 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (Supp. IV 1998) (expedited removal of aliens convicted of committing
aggravated felonies); INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. IV 1998) (judicial review).
22. See supra note 1.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
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Finally, this section acknowledges various solutions proffered by
commentators to alleviate the harsh impact of the recent immigration reforms
affecting aliens involved in criminal activity. However, it concludes that
piecemeal reform of the crime-related removal system within Congress’s
“fixed rules” framework will have only limited effects.
Part V proposes a new three-part crime-related removal system. First, it
suggests new criteria that establish a presumption of deportability. Second, it
preserves discretionary relief through a balancing test for use by the
immigration judge during the removal hearing. Finally, it restores judicial
review to the removal process.
II. HISTORY OF THE INA CRIME-RELATED REMOVAL SYSTEM
In 1952, Congress consolidated various immigration laws24 into one
specific piece of legislation, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).25
The INA enumerated several deportability grounds,26 including various
provisions for criminal activity.27 Under the original INA, an alien was
deportable if he committed offenses involving: moral turpitude;28 narcotics
trafficking and other drug-related crimes;29 firearms;30 prostitution;31 or
violations of miscellaneous national security and immigration laws.32 The
criminal offenses that constitute grounds for removal today have changed
dramatically since 1952.33 The current INA crime-related removal grounds
can be roughly classified into six principal categories: crimes of moral
turpitude;34 aggravated felonies;35 controlled substance offenses;36 firearms
24. See 1 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.02 (2000)
(outlining the history of immigration laws prior to 1952). See generally U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Michael LeMay & Elliott Robert
Barkan eds., 1999).
25. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (Supp. IV 1998)).
26. INA § 241(a), 8. U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1952) (codified as amended at INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a) (Supp. IV 1998)).
27. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
28. INA § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4).
29. INA § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11).
30. INA § 241(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(14).
31. INA § 241(a)(12), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(12).
32. INA §§ 241(a)(13), (15-17), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(13), (15-17).
33. INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
34. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). See also INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that multiple convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude
not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct are grounds for removal).
35. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). See also INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43) (Supp. IV 1998) (defining the term “aggravated felony” for purposes of the INA).
36. INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B).
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offenses;37 miscellaneous offenses involving national security, selective
service, and immigration;38 and crimes involving domestic violence,
violations of protective orders, stalking, and child abuse.39 Although these
general classifications resemble the offenses enumerated in the original INA,
the current provisions embody numerous reforms Congress first
implemented in the late 1980s.40
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (1988 Act)41 was the first piece of
legislation in which Congress drastically reformed the INA.42 The 1988 Act
created an entirely new class of deportable aliens by adding the “aggravated
felony” provision to the INA.43 Under the 1988 Act, the definition of
“aggravated felony” was quite narrow; Congress defined an “aggravated
felony” as “murder, any drug trafficking crime . . . [,] any illicit trafficking in
any firearms or destructive devices . . . [,] or any attempt or conspiracy to
commit any such act . . . within the United States.”44
In the 1990s, Congress continued to target aliens as part of its anti-crime
37. INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
38. INA §§ 237(a)(2)(D)(i-iii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(D)(i-iii) (regarding various national
security and Selective Service violations). See also INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv) (regarding high speed flight from an immigration checkpoint); INA
§ 237(a)(2)(D)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(iv) (regarding alien smuggling).
39. INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
40. See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text. For more discussion regarding the history of
the INA crime-related grounds for removal, see GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 71.05 (providing a
detailed history of each of the crime-related removal grounds while also providing an overview of the
current INA provisions).
41. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
42. Although the 1988 Act was the first piece of legislation to make drastic changes to the
original INA, there had been other reforms to the INA prior to 1988. For example the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 (1986 Act) reformed then INA § 241(a)(11) by eliminating the enumeration of the
types of drugs covered under the provision. The 1986 Act amended the statute so that it referred to
aliens who had committed offenses “relating to a controlled substance.” Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(11) (1982), with 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (Supp. IV 1986). See also Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-570, § 1751(b), 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 446; Julie K.
Rannik, Comment, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Death Sentence for
the 212(c) Waiver, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 123, 127 (1996).
43. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 7347. The 1988 Act created a presumption of
deportability for aggravated felons, rendering deportable any alien who committed a specified
“aggravated felony” after entry into the United States. Id. § 7347(c). Other consequences of the new
“aggravated felony” classification included restrictions on discretionary relief from deportation, id.
§ 7343(b), and ineligibility to return to the United States for a period of ten years after deportation. Id.
§ 7349(a).
44. Id. § 7342. See also INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1988); Terry Coonan,
Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets-Immigration Law’s New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 592-605 (1998) (tracing the establishment and evolution of the “aggravated felony”
definition from 1988 through 1996); Brent K. Newcomb, Comment, Immigration Law and the
Criminal Alien: A Comparison of Policies for Arbitrary Deportations of Legal Permanent Residents
Convicted of Aggravated Felonies, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 697, 698-702 (1998) (complementing Coonan’s
discussion).
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agenda.45 From 1990 to 1996, Congress enacted several statutes that
reformed the removal system for aliens who committed crimes.46 The
legislation embodied four basic approaches. First, Congress broadened the
removal grounds for criminal activity. The most notable example of this
expansion involved additions to the list of crimes that constitute “aggravated
felonies” under the INA.47 Second, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA)48 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA)49 reduced both the monetary
thresholds and the sentencing requirements of the enumerated “aggravated
felonies” and other offenses. As a result, these acts increase the number of
predicate crimes sufficient for removal.50 Third, both AEDPA and IIRAIRA
45. See supra note 4.
46. See supra note 6.
47. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1988) (in 1988, the “aggravated felony” definition
was limited to murder, drug trafficking, and firearm trafficking (including conspiracies and attempts to
commit such crimes)). But see GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, at 18 (the current “aggravated felony”
definition encompasses over fifty classes of crimes). To illustrate one example, section 440(e) of the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), added commercial bribery, counterfeiting,
forgery, certain types of stolen vehicle trafficking, obstruction of justice, perjury, and bribery of
witnesses to the “aggravated felony” definition. INA §§ 101(a)(43)(R), (S), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(43)(R), (S) (Supp. IV 1998). See also LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 447-48; infra text
accompanying notes 59-65; supra note 44.
Aside from broadening the crime-related removal grounds via expansion of the “aggravated
felony” definition, Congress has also added other offenses to the list of the crime-related removal
grounds. For example, section 350(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA) amended § 237(a)(2) to make crimes involving domestic violence, stalking,
child abuse, child neglect, child abandonment, and violations of protection orders, grounds for
removal. See INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 1998). See also infra notes 76-
77 and accompanying text.
48. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
49. Division C of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996).
50. The Immigration and Naturalization Technical Corrections Act of 1994 made fraud and tax
evasion aggravated felonies if they involved a loss of more than $200,000 to the victim and the
government, respectively. Immigration and Naturalization Technical Corrections Act of 1994 § 222(a);
INA §§ 101(a)(43)(M)(i), (ii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), (ii) (1994). See also Coonan, supra note
44, at 598. However, section 321(a)(7) of IIRAIRA reduced the monetary threshold requirements for
both of these crimes to $10,000. INA §§ 101(1)(43)(M)(i), (ii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), (ii)
(Supp. IV 1998). IIRAIRA also reduced the monetary threshold required to qualify money laundering
as an aggravated felony. Immigration and Naturalization Technical Corrections Act of 1994 § 222(a);
INA § 101(a)(43)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D) (1994) (money laundering constitutes an aggravated
felony if the amount involved exceeds $100,000). But see IIRAIRA § 321(a)(2); INA § 101(a)(43)(D),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D) (Supp. IV 1998) (lowering the threshold to $10,000). See also Coonan,
supra note 44, at 603.
AEDPA and IIRAIRA decreased the sentencing requirements for various aggravated felonies as
well. For example, section 440(e) of AEDPA lowered the five-year sentence threshold for document
fraud to eighteen months. Just a few months later, however, section 321(a)(9) of IIRAIRA reduced the
sentence requirement to one year. INA § 101(a)(43)(P), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(P) (Supp. IV 1998).
See also LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 447; Coonan, supra note 44, at 601, 603. Section 321 of
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IIRAIRA added the crimes of rape and sexual abuse of a minor to § 101(a)(43)(A), a subsection
previously embodying only the crime of murder. INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)
(1994). This change was significant because both crimes had previously constituted aggravated
felonies as a result of their status as crimes of violence. For the definition of “crime of violence,” see
infra note 63. Section 501(a)(3) of the Immigration Act of 1990 added crimes of violence to the
“aggravated felony” definition. Immigration Act of 1990, § 501(a)(3); INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) (1990); Coonan, supra note 44, at 593-597. Thus, in 1990, because the two crimes
qualified as crimes of violence aliens had to be sentenced to terms of five years or more before the INS
could deem them deportable. However, by explicitly adding rape and sexual abuse of a minor to
subsection (A), no specific sentence is now required for these crimes to be sufficient for removal. See
Richard J. Prinz, Criminal Aliens Under the IIRAIRA, 61 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 319, 323 (1999). IIRAIRA
also lowered the sentence-imposed requirement for crimes of violence, theft, and burglary from five
years to one year. Immigration and Naturalization Technical Corrections Act of 1994 § 222(a); INA
§§ 101(a)(43)(F), (G), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), (G) (1994). But see IIRAIRA § 321(a)(3); INA
§§ 101(a)(43)(F), (G), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), (G) (Supp. IV 1998). See also LEGOMSKY, supra
note 8, at 448; Coonan, supra note 44, at 602.
In addition to the decreased sentence requirement for aggravated felonies, AEDPA also modified
the sentence required for a crime of moral turpitude to qualify as a removable offense. Prior to the
enactment of AEDPA, an alien had to have an actual sentence of at least one year to qualify for
removal. INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1994). However, section 435 of
AEDPA amended the requirement so that a potential sentence of one year is now sufficient, regardless
of whether the alien serves a full twelve month sentence. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1998) (stating “[a]ny alien who is convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude . . . for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable”). See also
LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 443. For a discussion of other monetary and sentence threshold
reductions, see Coonan, supra note 44, at 592-605.
Congress also implemented two other significant changes by adding a new paragraph to IIRAIRA
entitled “Definition of Conviction and Term of Imprisonment.” First, prior to IIRAIRA, the question
of whether a particular action by a court constituted a “conviction” for removal purposes plagued the
courts. See Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (B.I.A. 1988). In Ozkok, the court held that one was
“convicted” for immigration purposes if his situation satisfied each of the following three elements:
(1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty;
(2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the person’s liberty to
be imposed; and
(3) judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person violates the terms of his
probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the court’s order, without availability of
further proceedings regarding the person’s guilt or innocence of the original charge.
Id. at 549 & n.4. However, section 322 of IIRAIRA, which overruled Ozkok, eliminated the last prong
of the court’s test. INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (Supp. IV 1998). Consequently,
whatever happens during or after deferred adjudication is irrelevant for removal purposes. See Prinz,
supra, at 333. To understand the implications of this new “conviction” definition for attorneys
representing alien criminal defendants, see Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal
Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV. 269, 300-333 (1997). See also Franco
Capriotti, et al., “Small-Time Crime/Big-Time Trouble: The New Immigration Laws, 13 CRIM. JUST. 4,
7 (1998).
Aside from adding the definition for “conviction,” IIRAIRA also provided a definition for “term
of imprisonment” to clarify the sentencing requirements for the enumerated offenses classified as
“aggravated felonies,” which use that language. INA §§ 101(a)(43)(F), (G), (P), (R), (S), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (P), (R), (S). IIRAIRA § 322 created INA § 101(a)(48)(B), which states:
Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to
include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any
suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.
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limited the forms of discretionary relief51 and procedural safeguards52
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B). Thus, “term of imprisonment” is intended to refer to the actual sentence
imposed, regardless of whether it was suspended. In contrast, other sentence requirements in section
101(a)(43) of the INA qualify crimes as “aggravated felonies” for removal purposes if certain
sentences “may be imposed” or are “punishable” by a certain sentence. INA §§ 101(a)(43)(J), (Q), (T),
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(J), (Q), (T). See also Bruce Robert Marley, Comment, Exiling the New
Felons: The Consequences of the Retroactive Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful
Permanent Residents, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 855, 868-69 (1998) (citing legislative history that
illustrates Congress’s intent for “term of imprisonment” to refer to actual imposed sentence);
LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 449.
Because this Note will assess the weaknesses of section 237(a)(2) of the INA and the other INA
removal provisions relating to that section, it is necessary to highlight an error in the “aggravated
felony” definition that is pertinent to a discussion regarding the “term of imprisonment” language. In
sections 101(a)(43)(F) and (G) of the INA, which describe when crimes of violence and theft and
burglary offenses will constitute aggravated felonies for immigration purposes, the drafters omitted the
verb “is” in stating the required sentences. The sentencing requirements for both provisions state “for
which the term of imprisonment [sic] at least one year.” INA §§ 101(a)(43)(F)(G), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(43)(F)(G). As other commentators have noted, this omission demonstrates that the
legislation is “sloppy.” Prinz, supra, at 321.
United States v. Graham illustrates the consequences of this minor mistake. 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir.
1999). In Graham, the alien defendant was previously convicted of petit larceny, a Class A
misdemeanor in New York, with a statutory maximum sentence of one year. Id. at 789. He received
the maximum one-year sentence and was thus removable. Id. Graham argued that because section
101(a)(43)(G) of the INA was missing a crucial verb, there were two plausible interpretations of the
“aggravated felony” provision. Id. at 790. The statute could refer to theft offenses “for which the term
of imprisonment is at least one year” or to theft offenses “for which the term of imprisonment imposed
is at least one year.” Id. Graham argued that the court should adopt the former interpretation. Id. Such
a reading of the statute, however, would require that the “minimum term for the theft offense has to be
at least one year.” Id. Graham contended that because his offense carried no minimum term in New
York, it did not constitute an “aggravated felony.” Id. The Court, relying on the definition of “term of
imprisonment” in section 101(a)(48) of the INA as the actual sentence imposed, rejected Graham’s
reasoning. Id. For a more detailed description of this mistake and another more intricate error, see
Prinz, supra, at 329-30.
In addition to commenting on the mistake in the statutory language, Prinz also notes that certain
drug crimes have been considered misdemeanors under state law. Thus, under the changes wrought by
IIRAIRA, the INS may attempt to characterize theft or assault convictions (misdemeanors under state
law) with a probated or suspended sentence as aggravated felonies. Id. Prinz’s assumption has proven
to be accurate. See Graham, 169 F.3d at 791-793. While holding that Graham’s one-year petit larceny
conviction qualified him as an “aggravated felon” for removal purposes, the court reasoned that “a
carelessly drafted piece of legislation has improvidently, if not inadvertently, broken the historic line
of division between felonies and misdemeanors.” Id. at 788. For more illustrations of how the removal
provisions impact aliens who have committed only minor crimes, see infra Part IV.C. See also supra
note 9.
51. By incorporating relief provisions into the INA, Congress acknowledged that removal is a
harsh sanction and that in some cases, the Attorney General should be able to waive it. LEGOMSKY,
supra note 8, at 463. As Congress enacted provisions that expanded the definition of “aggravated
felony,” however, it simultaneously withdrew the major forms of relief available to most of these
felons. For example, prior to 1996 many aliens were eligible to apply for a section 212(c) waiver. INA
§ 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). From 1989 to 1994, the Attorney General granted section 212(c)
relief to more than half of all immigrants who petitioned for it. Bennett, supra note 3, at 1701 n.23
(citing Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 178 (E.D.N.Y.)). Section 212(c) of the INA waived grounds
for deportability where there was a comparable ground of excludability. GORDON ET AL., supra note
24, § 64.04(1). After the 1990 reforms to the provision, an alien had to have maintained lawful
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unrelinquished domicile in the United States for seven consecutive years to be eligible for a 212(c)
waiver. Moreover, an alien was not eligible for such relief if he had been convicted of one or more
aggravated felonies for which he had served a term of imprisonment of five or more years. INA
§ 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), as amended by Immigration Act of 1990, §§ 511, 601(d). See also
GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, §§ 74.04(1), (2)(h). However, section 440(d) of AEDPA deemed
aliens convicted of aggravated felonies and offenses involving firearms and controlled substances
ineligible for § 212(c) relief. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c) (Supp. IV 1998). See also Mojico, F.
Supp. 130, at 137.
Furthermore, IIRAIRA limited the relief available to aliens involved in criminal activity as well.
IIRAIRA repealed the section 212(c) waiver altogether and modified another form of relief entitled
“suspension of removal.” INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (Supp. IV 1998). Section 304(a)(3) of
IIRAIRA altered the two forms of discretionary relief and consolidated them into one provision called
“cancellation of removal.” INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (Supp. III 1997). This reform had two major
consequences for the alien deemed removable on criminal grounds. First, prior to 1996, when an alien
petitioned for a section 212(c) waiver, he not only had to establish that he was statutorily eligible for
the relief pursuant to the conditions described above, but he had to receive the favorable exercise of
the Attorney General’s discretion as well. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). In Matter of
Marin, the Board of Immigration Appeals specified the criteria for determining whether or not to grant
discretion. See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 586 (B.I.A. 1978). The Marin court recognized
factors adverse to the alien’s petition, as well as those meriting favorable consideration. Id. The factors
included, inter alia: the nature and underlying circumstances of the deportability ground at issue; the
alien’s criminal record; the nature, recency, and severity of the offenses; rehabilitation; family ties
within the United States; duration of residence in the United States; service in the Armed Forces;
history of employment; potential hardship to the alien and his family members; and other evidence of
the alien’s good character. Id. For a more thorough discussion of the discretionary considerations, see
Rannik, supra note 42, at 126-139. See also GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 74.04(3); infra Part V.
However, by eliminating this waiver and substituting “cancellation of removal” in its place,
immigration judges, to whom the Attorney General has delegated the exercise of discretion, see 8
C.F.R. § 212.3(a), are no longer permitted to waive removal based on the balancing test prescribed in
Marin. Moreover, under section 240A(a) of the INA aliens convicted of an aggravated felony continue
to be barred from this form of relief. INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1998).
The second consequence of IIRAIRA’s creation of the “cancellation of removal” provision was
the modification made to a form of relief known as “suspension of deportation.” This type of relief
became the second prong of the “cancellation of removal” provision. INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b) (Supp. IV 1998). As the title of the provision states, it provides cancellation of removal and
adjustment of status to “certain nonpermanent residents.” INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
However, the actual language of the statute does not limit this form of relief to non-LPRs. LPRs who
satisfy the requirement of section 240A(b)(1)(A), which requires contiuous physical presence in the
United States for a period of ten years or more immediately preceding the date of the alien’s
application, should be eligible for such relief. INA § 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). See
GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 64.04(3). Prior to 1996, aliens convicted of various crimes, including
those involving moral turpitude and controlled substances, may have been eligible for “suspension of
deportation” as long as they satisfied the other statutory requirements. INA § 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a)(2) (1994). See GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, §§ 64.04(3), 74.07 (3)(c). However, IIRAIRA
amended the provision so that aliens are barred from such relief if they have been convicted of an
offense listed under section 237(a)(2) of the INA. INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C)
(Supp. IV 1998). See GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 64.04(3). For an overview of the current
“cancellation of removal” provision, see infra notes 83-99 and accompanying text. See also
LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 464-498.
52. See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in
United States Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 704 (1997) (stating that “[i]f judicial review of
administrative orders depriving noncitizens of the opportunity to live in the United States is an
essential part of the rule of law, then 1996 may well become known as the year in which the rule of
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available to many of the aliens affected by the various reforms to the removal
system. These restrictions made it more difficult, and in some cases
impossible, for aliens to circumvent the removal process.53 Finally, IIRAIRA
attached language to the end of the “aggravated felony” definition to require
retroactive application of the amended provision.54 Therefore, aliens became
removable for crimes that were not grounds for removal at the time that they
immigration law died.”). Section 440(a) of AEDPA and section 306(d) of IIRAIRA barred judicial
review of final orders of removal for aliens who are removable under various crime-related grounds.
INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. IV 1998). Moreover, section 306(a)(2) of IIRAIRA
barred judicial review of denials of relief for cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and
adjustment of status (a form of relief for non-LPRs, which is therefore outside the scope of this Note).
INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1998). But see Lenni B. Benson, The
New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 256-264 (1998)
(contending that some form of judicial review still exists despite the INA bar, as aliens can exercise
their rights to seek habeas corpus review). For an overview of the judicial review provisions in the
removal context, see generally Benson, supra; David Cole, No Clear Statement: An Argument for
preserving Judicial Review of Removal Decisions, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 427 (1998); GORDON ET AL.,
supra note 24, § 104.13. See also infra Part III.C.
Another restriction on the procedural safeguards available to aliens deemed deportable on crime-
related removal grounds occurred in 1990 with Congress’s repeal of a provision known as “judicial
recommendations against deportation” (commonly referred to as JRADs). Only those aliens who were
deportable under the moral turpitude grounds, the predecessors to sections 237(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii),
were eligible for JRAD relief. The sentencing judge had the authority to make a binding order that the
alien not be deported. After such an order, the INS was barred from deporting the alien on the basis of
the specified crime at issue in the JRAD. INA § 241(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1988). However,
section 505 of the Immigration Act of 1990 withdrew the JRAD device from the removal context.
LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 444-45. See generally Lisa R. Fine, Note, Preventing Miscarriages of
Justice: Reinstating the Use of “Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation”, 12 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 491 (1998).
In contrast to the JRAD procedure where sentencing judges had the authority to issue binding
orders against removal, today there are two statutory provisions that authorize judicial removal during
sentencing of aliens deportable on crime-related grounds. INA § 238(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (Supp. IV
1998); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (Supp. IV 1998). For an overview of the judicial removal process, see
LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 731-33. The issue of judicial removal has spurred much debate as the
provisions permit criminal sentencing judges to determine removal issues which have always been
considered civil in nature. See infra note 156. See, e.g., Ethan Venner Torrey, “The Dignity of
Crimes”: Judicial Removal of Aliens and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 187 (1999).
53. See supra notes 51-52.
54. Section 321(b) of IIRAIRA added the following sentence to the end of the aggravated felony
definition: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), the term applies
regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996.” INA
§ 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. IV 1998). Cf. LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 448
(demonstrating that under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the Immigration Act of 1990, the Immigration
and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, and AEDPA, deportability was limited to
convictions entered on or after the enactment dates of each statute). See generally Morawetz, supra
note 4 (rebutting the contention that Congress’s plenary power bars judicial assessment of retroactive
legislation in the immigration arena and questioning the constitutionality of such statutory provisions
via a substantive due process analysis).
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were committed, but became aggravated felonies subsequent to the
enactment of IIRAIRA.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT CRIME-RELATED REMOVAL SYSTEM
UNDER THE INA
A. Current Criminal Grounds for Removal
INA section 237(a)(2) enumerates the current removal provisions for
criminal activity.55 Under that section, the INS may remove an alien if he
commits a crime that falls in one of six general categories.56 First, an alien is
deportable if he is convicted of a crime of moral turpitude within five years
after his admission to the United States— or within ten years in the case of a
legal permanent resident— if a sentence of at least one year may be
imposed.57 Moreover, an alien is deportable if he is convicted of two or more
crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of
criminal conduct, regardless of the potential sentences or those imposed.58
Second, a conviction for an aggravated felony59 at any time after
admission is grounds for removal.60 In light of the many statutory expansions
to the provision since its inception in 1988, the definition now includes 50
classes of crimes61 ranging from theft62 to crimes of violence.63
55. INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1998). For a thorough overview of all of
the current crime-related removal grounds, see GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 71.05.
56. See supra notes 34-39.
57. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
58. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
59. Section 101(a)(43) of the INA lists the specific offenses that qualify as aggravated felonies.
INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
60. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
61. GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 71.05(2).
62. INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (“a theft offense (including receipt of stolen
property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [sic] at least one year”). For a
discussion about the minor error in the drafting of this provision (the lack of the verb “is”), see supra
note 50.
63. INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). A “crime of violence” is defined as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that driving while
intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence because of the potential that it will result in physicial harm.
GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 71.05(2)(d)(ii), n.398-401. For an overview of case law interpreting
“crimes of violence” as “aggravated felonies” for immigration purposes, see id. supra,
§ 71.05(2)(d)(ii).
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Third, an alien is deportable if he violates, conspires, or attempts to
violate, at any time after admission, any state, federal, or foreign law
involving a controlled substance.64 Moreover, drug abusers and addicts are
also deportable.65 However, the statute provides an exception for a single
offense “involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of
marijuana.”66
Fourth, violations of any law relating to firearms or destructive devices at
any time after admission are grounds for removal.67
Fifth, violations of various national security, selective service, and
immigration laws will result in removal.68 The national security and selective
service offenses relate to: espionage, sabotage, treason, and sedition;69 threats
against the President of the United States and successors to the Presidency;70
participation in any form in an expedition against a friendly nation;71 and
violations of the Trading With the Enemy Act and the Military Selective
Service Act.72 The immigration offenses involve: high speed flight from an
immigration checkpoint;73 alien smuggling;74 and importation of aliens for
prostitution or other immoral purposes.75
Finally, an alien is deportable if, at any time after admission, he is
convicted of a crime of domestic violence, stalking, child abuse, neglect, or
abandonment,76 or a violation of a protection order.77
B. Current Forms of Discretionary Relief Available to Removable Aliens
The INA authorizes various forms of relief for some removable aliens.78
64. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1998).
65. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).
66. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
67. INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
68. INA § 237(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D).
69. INA § 237(a)(2)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(i).
70. INA § 237(a)(2)(D)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(ii). See also 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1994).
71. INA § 237(a)(2)(D)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(ii). See also 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1994).
72. INA § 237(a)(2)(D)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(iii).
73. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv).
74. INA § 237(a)(2)(D)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(iv). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1994).
75. INA § 237(a)(2)(D)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(iv). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (1994).
76. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
77. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
78. See infra notes 79-82. See also INA § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (Supp. IV 1998) (dealing with
another form of relief known as “registry”). For an overview of the registry provision, see LEGOMSKY,
supra note 8, at 498-500. Aside from those forms of relief listed in the INA, there are also two other
measures available to some fortunate aliens. These measures include private bills and deferred action.
Private bills are specific pieces of legislation that are introduced by individual members of Congress.
Although Congress has recently reduced its employment of such bills, if enacted they function as a sort
of Congressional “pardon” for the particular alien. For an overview of the private bill form of relief,
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The four most significant forms of discretionary relief under the INA include
cancellation of removal,79 asylum,80 nonrefoulement,81 and voluntary
departure.82
The cancellation of removal provision has two prongs: INA sections
240A(a)83 and 240A(b).84 Section 240A(a) is limited to certain permanent
resident aliens85 and is used most often when the grounds for removal are
based on criminal activity.86 Under section 240A(a), the Attorney General
may cancel removal if the alien has been a lawful permanent resident for five
years or more,87 has resided continuously in the United States for seven years
after having been admitted in any status,88 and has not been convicted of an
aggravated felony.89
Section 240A(b)90 succeeds a former relief provision entitled “Suspension
of Deportation.”91 The section contains four eligibility requirements.92 First,
see GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 74.09. See also Note, Private Bills and the Immigration Law, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1956).
For an example of a private bill, see H.R. 321, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill was sponsored by
Congressman McCollum, a Florida Republican, to provide relief for Robert A. Broley, who was
deported to his native Canada. See Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; The Quality of Mercy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at A15. Some people question the motives of McCollum, a staunch supporter of
the 1996 immigration reforms, in sponsoring a private relief bill for Broley whose father is the
Treasurer of the Orange County Republican Executive Committee in Florida. Id.
The second form of relief, deferred action, is simply an administrative policy practiced by the
INS. By “deferring” action on removal proceedings, the INS delays its formal removal procedures. In
these cases, the INS can initiate removal proceedings but chooses not to do so. See 2 Immigr. L. Serv.
§ 17:153 (Supp. 2000) (“Deferred action status is granted as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.”).
79. INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (Supp. IV 1998).
80. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. IV 1998).
81. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1998).
82. INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (Supp. IV 1998).
83. INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
84. INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). These sections list the necessary requirements for the
alien to be eligible for the specified relief. However, although an alien may satisfy all of the requisite
statutory elements, he must show that he merits the favorable exercise of the Attorney General’s
discretion. For a good overview of “cancellation of removal”, see GORDON ET AL., supra note 24,
§ 64.04.
85. INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). For a good overview of “cancellation of removal,” see
Royal F. Berg, Cancellation of Removal for Permanent Resident Aliens, 61 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 301 (1999).
86. LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 465.
87. INA § 240A(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(1).
88. INA § 240A(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2).
89. INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).
90. INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
91. LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 465. Under subsection (b), the Attorney General has the power
to not only cancel an alien’s removal, but to adjust the status of the alien to that of a legal permanent
resident as well.
The current section’s title seems to limit cancellation of removal and adjustment of status to
“certain nonpermanent residents.” See INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). However, the language of
the provision does not state that legal permanent residents are excluded from its use if they are unable
to meet the requisite elements enumerated in 240A(a). GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 64.04(3).
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the alien must have been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than ten years immediately preceding the date
of his application for cancellation.93 Second, the alien must have been a
person of good moral character during the requisite ten-year period.94 Third,
the alien may not be inadmissible or removable under any of the criminal
grounds.95 Finally, the alien must establish that his removal would cause
extreme or exceptional hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, if
those relatives are United States citizens or lawful permanent residents.96
Because section 240A(a) precludes relief for aggravated felons97 and
section 240A(b) bars relief either for aliens lacking good moral character98 or
for those who have been convicted of any offense under section 237(a)(2),99
cancellation of removal is generally unattainable for most aliens who have
committed crimes.
Asylum and nonrefoulement (nonreturn) are intertwined remedies for
aliens who fear that they would be subjected to human rights violations in
their “home” countries.100 A grant of asylum allows an alien to remain in the
United States temporarily, and in most cases, permanently.101 Asylum is
available to an alien if he establishes that he “is unable or unwilling to return
to . . . [his home] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
such persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”102 An alien is barred from
92. See infra notes 93-96.
93. INA § 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).
94. INA § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B). Section 101(f) of the INA defines the term
“good moral character.” The list is not exhaustive, but it states that aliens lack good moral character if,
inter alia, they are confined as a result of a conviction to a prison for a period of at least one hundred
and eighty days, or if they have been convicted of an aggravated felony. INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C
§ 1101(f).
95. INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Nor may the alien be removable for failing
to register or falsifying documents. Id.
96. INA § 240(b)(1)(D), § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Aside from these statutory requirements, subsection
240A(b) contains a special rule easing some of the elements that battered spouses, children, and
parents of battered children have to establish in order to be eligible for the relief. However, the alien
spouse, child, or parent must demonstrate that the United States spouse or parent responsible for the
battery or extreme cruelty is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. INA § 240A(b)(2), 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2).
97. See supra note 89.
98. See supra note 94.
99. See supra note 95.
100. See Pilcher, supra note 50, at 295. For a more thorough assessment of asylum and
nonrefoulement, see generally LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 768-941.
101. See INA § 208(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1998) (regarding “Termination of
asylum”).
102. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(42). The INA provisions for asylum, incorporate by
reference the definition of refugee. INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).
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receiving a discretionary grant of asylum if he has been convicted of a
“particularly serious crime” and he “constitutes a danger to the community of
the United States.”103 For purposes of asylum, an “aggravated felony” is
considered to be a particularly serious crime.104 Therefore, aggravated felons
cannot petition for asylum because courts have held that an alien who has
been convicted of a particularly serious crime automatically poses a danger
to the United States community.105
Although similar to asylum, nonrefoulement encompasses different
eligibility requirements and provides a more limited form of relief.106 If an
eligible alien establishes that his “life or freedom would be threatened in [his
home] country because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion,” the Attorney General may not
remove him to that country.107 However, the Attorney General may remove
the alien to a third country.108 Like asylum, an alien may be ineligible for
nonrefoulement if the Attorney General deems that an alien convicted of a
particularly serious crime is a danger to the United States community.109 In
the nonrefoulement context, an alien who is convicted of a particularly
serious crime automatically satisfies the danger to the United States
community requirement as he does in the asylum arena.110 However, unlike
in the asylum context, aggravated felonies constitute “particularly serious
crimes” if the alien received a sentence of at least five years.111 Although
many of the offenses enumerated under the broad “aggravated felony”
definition do not satisfy the five-year sentence threshold, whether they
represent “particularly serious crimes” is to be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.112
Voluntary departure113 represents another example of discretionary relief
outlined in the INA. Its scope is more limited than the other INA relief
103. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).
104. INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).
105. In Matter of Carballe, the BIA held that a conviction of a “particularly serious crime
automatically renders the alien a danger to the community.” 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1986). This is
true for both asylum and nonrefoulement. LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 888.
106. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1998) (entitled “Restriction on removal to
a country where alien’s life or freedom would be threatened”). This section, although prohibiting
return to a country where the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened (presumably his “home”
country), does not preclude sending the alien to a safe third country.
107. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). See also Pilcher, supra note 50, at 295-96.
108. See supra note 106.
109. INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
110. See supra note 105.
111. INA § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (last paragraph of the provision).
112. Pilcher, supra note 50, at 296.
113. INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (Supp. IV 1998).
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provisions.114 Under this type of relief, an alien who departs “voluntarily”
does so by leaving the United States before the INS issues a formal removal
order against him.115 There are two advantages of this type of relief for the
alien.116 First, once an alien receives a formal removal order, he is ineligible
to return to the United States for at least ten years.117 This ineligibility period
extends to twenty years if the alien is convicted of a second offense.118 An
alien convicted of an aggravated felony is permanently barred from returning
to the United States.119 By engaging in a voluntary departure, an alien can
leave before the INS issues a removal order against him and thus
circumvents the “ineligible to return” period.120 Second, a removable alien
often faces mandatory detention.121 If he voluntarily departs, he does not
have to be detained and may not have to post bond.122
There are two types of voluntary departure, which are distinguishable
based on their timing.123 The first form is embodied in INA subsection
240B(a).124 That subsection authorizes the Attorney General to permit an
alien to depart voluntarily, at his own expense, at any time before removal
proceedings are final.125 Subsection 240B(b) permits voluntary departure, at
the conclusion of removal proceedings, at the alien’s expense.126
Although Congress prohibits aggravated felons from returning to the
United States after their removal,127 they are completely barred from
voluntary departure relief.128 Moreover, section 240B(b) contains a good
moral character requirement that also renders aliens who have committed
crimes other than aggravated felonies unable to voluntarily depart.129
114. LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 508-510.
115. Id. at 508.
116. Id. at 509.
117. INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 509.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. INA §§ 240B(a), 240B(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(a), 1229c(b).
124. INA § 240B(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a).
125. INA § 240B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1).
126. INA § 240B(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b). Like cancellation of removal, voluntary departure
requires the Attorney General’s favorable exercise of discretion. See INA §§ 240B(a)(1), 240B(b)(1),
8 U.S.C. 1229c(a)(1), 1229c(b)(1) (stating “[t]he Attorney General may . . . .”)
127. See supra note 117.
128. INA §§ 240B(a)(1), 240B(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(a)(1), 1229C(b)(1)(c).
129. INA § 240B(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B).
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C. Judicial Review of Both Removal Orders and Denials of Discretionary
Relief
Through AEDPA and IIRAIRA, Congress enacted sweeping reforms to
the judicial review procedures enumerated in the INA.130 The current judicial
review provisions raise numerous statutory interpretation and constitutional
questions.131 AEDPA and IIRAIRA deprived the courts of jurisdiction to
review both crime-related orders of removal132 and most denials of
discretionary relief.133 INA section 242(a)(2)(C) bars judicial review of any
final order of removal against an alien who is removable as a result of
committing an aggravated felony, two moral turpitude crimes for which a
sentence of at least one year may be imposed, controlled substance and
firearms offenses, or other miscellaneous crimes.134 Therefore, although a
majority of the aliens whom the INS deems removable as a result of criminal
activity are not statutorily eligible for the most lasting forms of relief,135 in
most cases, courts of appeal do not even have jurisdiction to determine the
legality of their removal orders.136 Moreover, pursuant to INA section
242(a)(2)(B)(i), denials of both forms of cancellation of removal and
voluntary departure are not reviewable.137
IV. ANALYSIS: REMOVAL AS THE ULTIMATE CAVEAT
A. The “Blurring” of the Citizen Versus Alien Distinction
In evaluating the INA crime-related removal system,138 it is necessary to
question why policymakers recognize removal as an appropriate sanction.139
The underlying assumption is that significant disparities exist between the
130. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 104.12(1).
131. See id. § 104.13(2).
132. AEDPA § 440(a), IIRAIRA § 306(d). See also INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)
(Supp. IV 1998).
133. AEDPA § 440(a), IIRAIRA § 306(d). See also INA § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B).
134. INA § 242(a)(2)(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(c). Various complex statutory interpretation issues
have surfaced as a result of the 1996 judicial review reforms. Although a discussion of these issues is
outside the scope of this Note, three texts address many of the problems. See, e.g., Benson, supra note
52; GORDON ET AL., supra note 24, § 104.13; LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 618-645 & 1999 Supp. at
50-51. For a theoretical discussion of the limits on judicial review of discretionary decisions, see
generally Kanstroom, supra note 52.
135. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 132, 134 and accompanying text.
137. INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). See also supra note 133.
138. See supra Part III.
139. See supra note 5. See also infra note 140.
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rights of United States citizens and those of aliens, which permit removal as
an acceptable way to solve problems related to immigration.140 Although this
premise is accurate,141 it is debatable whether a just rationale exists for the
distinction between the two populations.142 Notwithstanding the different
treatment of United States citizens and aliens, the conclusion that removal is
an acceptable sanction for an alien who commits a crime must be
examined.143 This issue is particularly important in light of the fact that the
current removal provisions may deem removable legal permanent residents
who have established significant roots in the United States after decades of
residence in this country.144
B. Evaluating the Nexus Between Congress’s Means and Ends in the
Removal Arena
Congress’s expansion of the crime-related removal grounds145 and its
restrictions on the forms of relief146 and opportunities for judicial review
available to aliens147 make it necessary to compare the implications of such
changes with the justifications for removal. The purpose of this comparison
is to assess whether the adverse impact of the current INA crime-related
removal provisions on the alien population148 makes sense in light of the
140. See supra note 5. It is precisely the perpetuation of this distinction between United States
citizens and the alien population as outsiders that makes removal seem like an acceptable solution.
Many who advocate for the removal of aliens who have committed crimes do so based on nativist
tendencies, which suggest that because aliens were born elsewhere, the United States should not have
to bear the burden of their criminal behavior. In essence, those who maintain this idea argue that it is
easier to send the aliens back to their original homelands rather than permit their continued residence
in the United States. See generally Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens,
Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMM. 9 (1990); THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF &
DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 956-973 (Interim 2d ed. 1991).
141. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 1011. Federal and state laws impose numerous restrictions
on aliens as compared to citizens. Id. These restrictions include: professional licenses, government
employment, public benefits, property ownership, and the right to vote. Id.
142. As noted by Professor Legomsky:
comparisons between the respective rights of citizens and aliens have produced discussion of (a)
whether under existing law citizenship in fact has important consequences and (b) whether
citizenship should be important. Few deny that significant differences do, and should, separate
citizens from undocumented aliens or even from lawful nonimmigrants. The real issues have
centered around the differences between citizens and lawful permanent residents.
Id. at 1017.
143. See infra Part IV.B.
144. See supra note 8. See also infra Part IV.C.
145. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. See also supra Part III.A.
146. See supra note 51. See also supra Part III.B.
147. See supra note 52. See also discussion infra Part III.C.
148. See infra Part IV.C.
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policy grounds for removal.149
The Supreme Court has repeatedly defined the consequences of
deportation.150 For instance, in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,151 Justice Douglas
stated that “deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of
banishment or exile.”152 In Ng Fung Ho v. White,153 Justice Brandeis declared
that “[deportation] may result . . . in loss of both property and life; or of all
that makes life worth living.”154 However, although the Court has
acknowledged that, with regard to a deportation proceeding, “[t]he stakes are
indeed high and momentous for the alien who has acquired his residence
here,”155 it has consistently held that deportation is not intended to punish the
individual.156 In light of the Court’s denial that it is a punitive sanction, the
149. See infra notes 150-65 and accompanying text.
150. For a discussion of why the term “deportation” is used in this section rather than the term
“removal,” see supra note 10.
151. 333 U.S. 6 (1948). Fong Haw Tan was convicted on two counts of murder. Id. at 9. The state
separately charged him with the murder of two individuals although the homicides occurred “on or
about the same date.” Id. at 8. The Court held that an immigration provision dealing with multiple
criminal convictions for offenses involving moral turpitude, currently section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the
INA should be strictly construed. Id. at 9-10. The Court thus concluded that Tan’s two counts of
murder did not constitute separate criminal offenses sufficient to invoke a deportation proceeding
under the immigration statute. Id. at 9-10. The Court reasoned that “since the stakes are considerable
for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on [Tan’s] freedom beyond that
which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.” Id. at 10.
152. Id. at 10.
153. 259 U.S. 276 (1922). In Ng Fung Ho, four Chinese individuals were detained under warrants
of deportation that cited, inter alia, that they were in the United States in violation of section 6 of the
Chinese Exclusion Act. Id. at 278. See Chinese Exclusion Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25
(repealed 1943). Regarding two of the petitioners, Gin Sang Get and Gin Sang Mo, their assertions of
United States citizenship entitled them to a judicial determination of the validity of their claims. Id. at
281-82, 285. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment relating to them and remanded to the
district court for a judicial determination of the validity of their citizenship claims. Id. at 285. The
Court reasoned that “[t]o deport one who so claims to be a citizen obviously deprives him of liberty
. . . .” Id. at 284.
154. Id. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). In Bridges, the Supreme Court reversed
a decision of the Ninth Circuit holding Bridges deportable. Id. at 157. The Court reasoned that the
Court of Appeals had misconstrued the term “affiliation” as it was used in an immigration provision
proscribing membership or affiliation in the Communist Party of the United States. Id. at 156. The
Court found that deportation may “visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the right to pursue a
vocation or a calling.” Id. at 147. Thus, the Court assumed that Congress intended the term
“affiliation” to be interpreted narrowly so that extreme harship would not be imposed on the alien for
“slight or insubstantial reasons.” Id.
155. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947). The Court’s qualification that the stakes
are high for one “who has acquired his residence,” here demonstrates that the Court recognized the
importance of the possible roots that an alien could establish while living in the United States. Id.
156. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, while it
may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment.”); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S.
585, 591 (1913) (deportation is not a punishment); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893):
The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime . . . . It is but a method of enforcing the
Washington University Open Scholarship
1549 Ulin.doc 04/24/01   5:04 PM
1570 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:1549
only justification it has provided for deportation is that “it is simply a refusal
by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want.”157 This
exercise of congressional authority is grounded in Congress’ plenary power
to regulate immigration and the assumed incidents of such regulation.158
Considering this rationale for deportation in conjunction with Congress’s
current crime-related removal system, it seems apparent that the crime-
related removal grounds and statutory bars to relief and judicial review are
not narrowly tailored to accommodate Congress’s objective of promoting
public welfare and safety.159 Although Congress has the power to render
return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the
performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority and
through the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. He
has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; and the
provisions of the constitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.
Id. at 730. See also Venner Torrey, supra note 52 (arguing that section 238(c) of the INA, which
permits judicial removal orders at the time of sentencing, appends the deportation proceedings to
criminal prosecutions, but simultaneously withholds the constitutionally-mandated protections
accorded criminal proceedings because the Supreme Court has deemed deportation civil in nature);
Pilcher, supra note 50, at 300-28 (examining the immigration consequences arising from decisions
made at the various stages of the criminal justice process); Mahler, 264 U.S. at 39 (stating that the
proscription against Congress passing an ex post facto law in Art. 1, section 9 of the Constitution
applies only to criminal laws, and deportation is not criminal in nature); Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12
(N.D. Ill. 1975), rev’d 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976). The district court held that the deportation of
Lieggi constituted cruel and unusual punishment, id. at 21, because he had lived in the United States
since he was 15, had maintained steady employment, and was the sole supporter of his family. Id. at
14. The Seventh Circuit reversed. 529 F.2d at 530. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Reforming the Criteria
for the Exclusion and the Deportation of Alien Criminal Offenders, 12 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 64,
66 (1990) (stating that the Seventh Circuit reversed Lieggi because “the constitutional prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment simply did not apply to deportation”).
157. Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at 591.
158. As a result of the plenary power doctrine, the judicial branch gives extraordinary deference to
Congress in matters involving immigration law and policy. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 1015
(“[g]enerally congressional action that discriminates against even lawful permanent resident aliens has
been upheld, in part because of Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration and the assumed
similarity between immigration laws and other alien regulation”). See, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952); Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at 591 (“[i]t is throroughly established that Congress has power to order
the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful”); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (the Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“[t]he power of exclusion of
foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part
of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution . . . .”).
See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century
of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545
(1990).
159. The language used in this subsection implies that the crime-related removal system is subject
to strict scrutiny equal protection analysis. Strict scrutiny analysis is applied to alienage classifications
created by state and local governments because the Supreme Court has deemed such classifications to
be “suspect.” See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that “a state statute that
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aliens removable in order to protect the national interest,160 the adverse
impact that the current INA removal provisions have had on numerous aliens
demonstrates that Congress’s means are overinclusive.161 Considering the
high stakes involved,162 it is irrational for an individual who has committed
only a minor criminal offense to be permanently removed from the United
States under the guise of public safety.163 Moreover, Congress may employ
its broad plenary power and determine that it does not “want” to harbor164 an
alien who has committed a felony, but Congress’s choice should be weighed
against the inequities that such a removal would impose on the alien.165
Congress’s expansive power to regulate immigration should not so easily
trump the rights of a legal permanent resident who has lived in the United
States for decades and has developed and maintained significant roots in the
United States, but who, unfortunately, has also committed a criminal offense.
C. Illustrations of the Flaws of the Current INA Removal System
Accounts of the harsh consequences of the INA crime-related removal
system are prevalent in the media. Perhaps the best way to understand how
the crime-related removal system impacts aliens is to consider some of these
stories.
denies welfare benefits to resident aliens and one that denies them to aliens who have not resided in
the United States for a specified number of years violate the Equal Protection Clause”). On the other
hand, due to the federal government’s plenary power to regulate immigration, alienage classifications
promulgated by Congress must only be rationally related to a legitimate government objective. See
supra note 158; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
621-22 (1997); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 729-31 (2d ed. 1991).
However, the author of this Note questions the logic behind this settled law. See text
accompanying notes 162-165. See also Gerald M. Rosenberg, The Protection of Aliens from
Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 336-338, cited in
CHEMERINSKY, at 622:
[T]he reasons for treating alienage as a suspect classification apply as forcefully to the federal
government as to the states . . . . The Court’s repeated insistence that Congress has plenary power
to act against aliens in any way it wants must be seen as an invitation to Congress to act
capriciously and without significant concern for the legitimate interest of resident aliens.
See also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 140, at 37-39 (citing commentary involving “modern
attacks on ‘plenary power’”).
160. See supra note 158.
161. See infra Part IV.C.
162. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 9. See also infra Part IV.C. See also Morowetz, supra note 4, at 159 (in listing
the rationales proffered for enacting retroactive legislation, Morowetz criticizes the justification that
Congress has identified aliens involved in criminal activity as undesirables: “[c]an it be rational to say
that a person is per se undesirable because of a twenty-year-old conviction for selling a marijuana
cigarette?”).
164. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
165. See discussion infra Part V.
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Mary Anne Gehris has resided in the United States for approximately
thirty-three years.166 Her German birth mother gave her up for adoption to an
American serviceman and his wife.167 Although Gehris was never
naturalized, she has lived in the United States for her entire life.168 In 1988,
when Gehris was twenty-two years-old, she caught her boyfriend cheating on
her in a car with another woman.169 She yelled at the woman and pulled the
woman’s hair.170 The woman subsequently pressed charges and Gehris
pleaded guilty to simple battery.171 She received a one-year suspended
sentence and a year’s probation.172 Gehris is currently a wife and mother of
two children, one of whom has cerebral palsy and is institutionalized.173 In an
attempt to obtain scholarship money for college courses in criminal justice,
Gehris applied for citizenship in 1997.174 When she provided the INS
authorities information about her conviction, the INS informed her of her
deportability status rather than furthering her citizenship application.175
Gehris found a way around the threat of removal via a state pardon for her
crime by the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles in March 2000.176
Other LPRs are not as fortunate as Gehris. For example, Carlos Garcia
Nunez, a forty-five-year-old native of the Dominican Republic, has lived in
the United States for eighteen years.177 In 1995, Garcia-Nunez pleaded guilty
to a drug offense for which he received a five-month sentence.178 A
representative for the ACLU remarked that the sentencing judge reduced
Garcia-Nunez’s sentence pursuant to federal sentencing guidelines because
of his minor role in the drug offense and his extraordinary family
166. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; This Has Got Me in Some Kind of Whirlwind; N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2000, at A13. Anthony Lewis is a two-time pulitzer-prize winning syndicated columnist for the
New York Times. His “Abroad at Home” column often focuses on the harsh consequences of the 1996
INA reforms.
167. Dateline NBC (television broadcast, Feb. 9, 2000).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The other woman also alleged that Gehris grabbed her around the neck, but Gehris denies
this claim. Id.
171. Id.
172. Lewis, supra note 166.
173. Dateline, supra note 167.
174. Id. See also Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Rays of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at
A15.
175. Dateline, supra note 167; Lewis, supra note 174.
176. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Measure of Justice; N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at A13.
Gehris became a United States citizen on February 9, 2001. See Lewis, supra note 174.
177. Karen Lee Ziner, ACLU Joins Fight to Save Man from Deportation, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL,
September 10, 1999, at 3B.
178. Id.
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circumstances.179 Both of Garcia-Nunez’s children suffer from medical
conditions.180 Moreover, Garcia-Nunez and his wife also care for one of their
grandchildren.181 Garcia-Nunez’s lawyer further states that his client “has
demonstrated complete rehabilitation since his conviction, and evidences,
primarily, through service to his family, outstanding character values.”182
However, despite Garcia-Nunez’s eighteen-year residence in the United
States, his personal circumstances, and his demonstrated rehabilitation, an
immigration judge ordered his removal.183
In 1985, Gabriella Dee, another alien adversely affected by the INA
criminal activity provisions, pleaded guilty to smuggling her Israeli boyfriend
across the United States-Canada border.184 She was a Canadian citizen
residing in Canada at the time.185 Dee was fined $25.00 for the offense.186
Years later, Dee obtained a student visa and moved to Pennsylvania.187 She
got married and earned a PhD. from Lehigh University.188 However, in 1998,
Dee’s misdemeanor qualified as “alien smuggling” under the retroactive
aggravated felony provision and the INS initiated removal proceedings
against her.189
These stories are just a sampling of the harsh consequences that the
current crime-related removal system has had on the alien population.190
D. A Critique of Congress’s “Fixed Rules” Approach Within the INA
Crime-Related Removal System
In assessing the weaknesses of the INA crime-related removal system, it
would be unreasonable to assume that legislation can ever reach some degree
of perfection. If that were the case, the legal profession would become
virtually obsolete with no need for the challenges of statutory interpretation
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Christian D. Berg, Deportation Case Isn’t Unique, [Congressman] McHale Says— Her
Lawyer Says Gabriella Dee is a Victim of Alien Smuggling Law, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL,
February 8, 1998, at A2.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Michael D. Goldhaber, Immigration Reform is a Hot Issue: Deportation Horror Stories Spur
Congress to the Problem, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 18, 2000, at A1 (“As one deportation horror story after
another has made headlines in recent months, a consensus has quietly emerged that the strict
immigration laws that give rise to such stories need to be fixed.”).
Washington University Open Scholarship
1549 Ulin.doc 04/24/01   5:04 PM
1574 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:1549
and the discovery of legislative loopholes. However, building on that
assumption, statutes can still be characterized as bad law, and numerous
commentators agree that the INA crime-related removal provisions represent
a case in point.191 Congress has exercised its plenary power in the
immigration arena192 by implementing fixed rules to deal with the issue of
alien criminal activity.193 The provisions demonstrate an effort by Congress
to solidify its “tough on crime” agenda within the immigration laws.194 This
Note questions the “fixed rules” approach in the crime-related removal
context in light of the consequences it has had on the alien population in the
United States.195 Through the expansion of the crime-related removal
grounds,196 especially the increase in offenses considered “aggravated
felonies”197 and the statutory limits on discretionary relief,198 Congress’s
rigid rules unjustly impact many aliens.199 Moreover, the “fixed” nature of
the approach bars judicial assessments of the provisions200 and therefore,
precludes even a modicum of flexibility. As a result of the high stakes
involved in removal for the alien, a rigid system with little or no relief goes
against the historical role of immigration policy.201
E. The Limited Effectiveness of Reforming Parts of the Crime-Related
Removal System: Can Real Change Occur Within this “Fixed Rules”
Framework?
There have been numerous recommendations proffered to alleviate the
191. See Prinz, supra note 50, at 321 (characterizing the legislation as “sloppy”). See also
Graham, 169 F.3d at 788 (remarking that the “aggravated felony” definition, section 101(a)(43) of the
INA, is “carelessly drafted”); end of discussion supra note 50; Berg, supra note 184 “[the recent
reforms] have the best of intentions and the sloppiest of language”) (quoting Congressman Paul
McHale (R-PA)).
192. See supra note 158.
193. See supra Part III. See also infra note 194.
194. See supra note 4. See also Morowetz, supra note 4, at 157. Members of Congress who
sponsored the legislation to make the definition of “aggravated felony” harsher expressed concern over
the way in which the immigration judges and the BIA were granting relief. Id. Thus, the per se bar to
relief for some aliens can be seen as a legislative attempt to control the exercise of discretion by saying
that no circumstances could justify relief from deportation when the crime is one classified as an
aggravated felony. Id. This rationale for barring judicial relief demonstrates the major problem with
Congress’s “fixed rules” approach.
195. See supra Part IV.C.
196. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. See also supra Part III.A.
197. See supra note 196.
198. See supra note 51. See also supra Part III.B.
199. See supra Part IV.C.
200. See supra note 52. See also supra Part III.C.
201. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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harsh effects that the recent reforms202 have had on the alien population. A
majority of the proposals advocate limited actions that would provide some
form of flexibility within the current crime-related removal framework.
Generally, commentators promote a middle ground by retreating to pre-1996
removal provisions and practices.203 For example, suggested reforms include:
eliminating the retroactivity language that IIRAIRA attached to the
“aggravated felony” definition;204 limiting the grounds for removal by
narrowing the “aggravated felony” definition;205 restoring judicial
recommendations against deportation;206 re-employing modified forms of
discretionary relief;207 and repealing the statutory bar on various forms of
202. See supra note 6.
203. See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
204. See Morawetz, supra note 4, at 160 (questioning the constitutionality of the retroactivity
language in the current provisions). See also H.R. 5062, 106th Cong. (2000) (modifying the
retroactivity language imposed by IIRAIRA so that most aliens convicted of aggravated felonies under
the INA prior to 1996 would still be eligible for section 240A(a) relief). House Bill 5062 passed
unanimously in the House on September 19, 2000. H.R. 5062, WL 1999 US H.B. 5062 (SN).
However, the bill died in the Senate at the end of the 106th term. Lewis, supra note 174.
205. See Sara A. Martin, Postcards from the Border: A Result-Oriented Analysis of Immigration
Reform Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA, 19 B.C. THIRD WORD L.J. 683, 707 (1999).
206. See Fine, supra note 52, at 507-08 (proposing the reinstatement of the JRAD in limited
cases). See also LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 445 (suggesting as an alternative to JRADs, a more
radical approach in which the INA could bar removal unless the sentencing judge recommends it).
207. This suggested reform has at least two variations. The first recommendation is the most
basic, calling for the restoration of discretionary relief provisions such as the INA § 212(c) waiver. See
Martin, supra note 205. For a brief overview of the § 212(c) waiver, see supra note 51.
See also H.R. 171, 107th Cong. (2001) (providing discretionary relief for alien veterans of the
United States Armed Forces); H.R. 87 § 2(b), 107th Cong. (2001) (reinstating relief measures for
LPRs “affected by the changes [to] the definition of ‘aggravated felony’” under IIRAIRA); H.R. 3272,
106th Cong. (1999) (same); H.R. 2999, 106th Cong. (1999) (providing section 204A(a) relief to some
LPRs affected by changes made to the definition of “aggravated felony” under IIRAIRA and
AEDPA); H.R. 1485, 106th Cong. (1999) (providing section 240A(a) relief to aliens who were
convicted of crimes but sentenced to less than five years in jail).
The second reform suggests employing the INA § 241(b)(3) (nonrefoulement) definition of
“particularly serious crime” in the cancellation of removal context. This would allow an alien to get
some measure of relief if he were convicted of an aggravated felony with less than a five-year
sentence. See Coonan, supra note 44, at 617.
Aside from proposing limited statutory reforms, some supporters of the harsh 1996 immigration
laws advocated for the INS to exercise prosecutorial discretion in extreme hardship cases. Anthony
Lewis, Abroad at Home; Cases that Cry Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2000, at A15. On November 17,
2000, former INS Commissioner, Doris Meissner, issued guidelines to advise INS staff on exercising
such prosecutorial discretion. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Commissioner, INS, to INS
Officials (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/
polpromem.htm. Guidelines for exercising prosecutorial discretion in particular program areas, such as
for placing an alien in deferred status already existed. Id. See also supra note 78. However, due to the
1996 INA reforms and the “increased attention to the scope and exercise of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service’s prosecutorial discretion,” the November 2000 INS guidelines advise INS
officials on how to exercise general prosecutorial discretion. Memorandum, supra. Alluding to
extreme hardship cases, the INS guidelines state that “As a general matter, INS officers may decline to
prosecute a legally sufficient immigration case if the federal immigration enforcement interest that
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judicial review.208 Although these solutions attempt to reduce the harsh
implications of the current crime-related removal provisions, they modify
only parts of the current system, thus the other crime-related removal
sections remain untouched, limiting their effectiveness.
True reform under the INA crime-related removal system can occur only
through a complete overhaul of the existing framework. An ideal system
would abandon the notion that removal is a permissible mechanism to
alleviate alien criminal activity.209 It would recognize that Congress’s
objective in maintaining the removal system is to protect the public from
alien criminal offenders who pose an actual social threat. However, it would
simultaneously acknowledge the high stakes involved in removal for the
alien.210
V. PROPOSAL: REMOVING THE FINE PRINT
This Note proceeds as though Congress has wiped the slate clean. It
proposes a common sense crime-related removal system grounded in
flexibility and fairness. This approach involves three parts. First, it suggests
new criteria to determine a presumption of deportability. Second, it preserves
discretionary relief through a balancing test assessed by the immigration
judge during the removal hearing. Finally, it restores judicial review to the
removal process.
The question of what criteria should be used to determine deportability is
difficult for three reasons. First, because it involves a determination of what
offenses are appropriate removal grounds in light of the congressional
objective to protect public safety, value judgments about the severity of
would be served by prosecution is not substantial.” Id. at 3.
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion within the INS is limited however, because there is no
guarantee that INS officials will exercise such discretion in cases similar to those in Part IV.C.
Moreover, although the INS may exercise its discretion and decline to initiate removal proceedings
against an alien who has committed a crime, the alien will be ineligible for citizenship and unable to
travel abroad. INA §§ 316(a), 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1182(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See
also Lewis, supra.
208. See Martin, supra note 205, at 707. See also H.R. 87 § 7(a), 107th Cong. (2001) (reinstating
judicial review); H.R. 1485 § 2(a)(7) (allowing judicial review of relief determinations). Some argue
that despite the INA bar on judicial review of removal orders, removable aliens can assert their legal
rights via habeus corpus review. See Benson, supra note 52. See also St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2001) (No. 00-767) (involving whether or
not federal district courts have habeus corpus jurisdiction to review orders of removal); Calcano-
Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000)
(No. 00-1011) (involving whether or not federal appellate courts have habeus corpus jurisdiction to
review orders of removal).
209. See infra Part V.
210. See supra note 155.
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crimes are inescapable. Second, because the criteria will be applied on a
national level, the nonuniform state penal provisions make such applications
quite complex.211 Third, if the INS assesses removal by balancing the social
threat posed by the alien against the stakes involved for him, some means to
consider the alien’s roots in the United States must be part of the equation.
Under the current system, Congress has expressly defined all of the
offenses that constitute grounds for removal.212 The current provisions are
often broad,213 in some cases vague,214 and do not take into account the lack
of uniformity amongst state criminal codes. The rigidity of the provisions and
the statutory bar of discretionary relief215 have resulted in the removal of
aliens who have committed only trivial crimes.216 Moreover, Congress has
chosen to ignore the reality of the high stakes involved in removal for the
alien.217
This proposal begins with the premise that any criteria selected to
determine deportability could not be implemented in isolation. The criteria
must be assessed simultaneously through a process that would provide
immigration judges with a discretionary balancing test to evaluate removal
by weighing the interests of Congress against the burden involved for the
particular alien. Although deportability criteria can be formulated that would
address the complexities involved, a discretionary test employed during the
removal hearing would ensure fairness.
Assuming that deportability criteria will be coupled with a discretionary
test during the removal hearing, reform of the removal system must begin by
outlining the proper criteria. In 1990, Professor Stephen Legomsky suggested
a new proposal that would base the criteria used to determine removal on a
series of variables involving the number of crimes committed, the sentences
for those crimes, and duration of residence in the United States at the
moment the INS has instituted removal proceedings.218 Legomsky suggested
substituting the INA crime-related removal grounds with a provision or set of
211. See generally Bennett, supra note 3.
212. See INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). See also supra Part III.A.
213. See supra note 61.
214. See INA §§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii), 8. U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii). See also Jay Wilson, The
Definitional Problems with “Moral Turpitude,” 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 261, 261 (1991) (“[m]oral
turpitude is an elusive, vague, and troublesome concept in the law, incapable of precise definition,
such is evidenced by the myriad of definitions and interpretations in judicial opinions.”).
215. See supra note 51. See also supra III.B.
216. See supra Part IV.C. See also supra note 9.
217. See supra note 155. See also supra note 194.
218. Legomsky, supra note 156, at 68. Stephen H. Legomsky is the Charles F. Nagel Professor of
International and Comparative Law at Washington University in St. Louis.
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provisions that lists different combinations of the variables.219 This Note’s
proposal adopts Legomsky’s variable approach. However, although
Legomsky focused on sentence in order to gauge the seriousness of the social
threat posed by the alien,220 another variable that could serve as a substitute
would be a “felony/misdemeanor threshold.” Rather than utilizing the
sentence of a crime to determine deportability, such a threshold test would
create a presumption of deportability if the crime were a felony in the state of
conviction. As in the sentence test, where the sentence alone is not
dispositive in creating a presumption of deportability, the characterization of
the crimes committed by the alien as “felonious” would also have to be
weighed against the durational residence factor. This variable approach is
beneficial because, by creating a presumption of deportability based on a
long sentence or classification of the crime as a felony, it would give
Congress the ability to remove an alien only if he posed a real social threat.
Moreover, by assessing the length of time the alien has been in the United
States at the moment that the INS initiates removal proceedings, the
provision takes into account the stakes involved for the alien.
However, this variable approach has a major weakness, and although
vesting the immigration judge with a discretionary balancing test during the
removal hearing would theoretically alleviate this flaw, it deserves comment.
The problem is grounded in the lack of uniformity among the state criminal
codes.221 With regard to the “felony/misdemeanor threshold,” some states
may classify a specific crime as a misdemeanor, while others may
characterize the same crime as a felony.222 The same problem holds true with
the sentence factor. For instance, Legomsky’s proposal contends that various
policy decisions would need to be made in order to base the removal criteria
on sentence.223 Professor Legomsky questions whether the sentence should
be determined by relying on the maximum sentence that could be imposed
under the statute, the sentence actually imposed by the sentencing judge, or
the time actually served by the alien.224 Regardless of what sentence
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See generally Bennett, supra note 3.
222. Id.
223. Legomsky, supra note 156, at 68.
224. Id. In basing the statutory criterion on the sentence imposed, Legomsky acknowledges that
the requirement would be based on the biases of the sentencing judge. Id. However, basing the
sentence requirement on time actually served would subject the requirement to the biases of the
particular parole board. Id. As the discretionary balancing test exercised by the immigration judge
during the removal hearing would take into account the maximum information available about the
alien, including the time he actually served, it may make the most sense to base the statutory criterion
on the sentence actually imposed.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/7
1549 Ulin.doc 04/24/01   5:04 PM
2000] THE  INA’S CRIME-RELATED REMOVAL SYSTEM 1579
determination is applied, the reality exists that the sentences for the crimes
are formulated by the states.225 Although the state may employ a maximum
sentence threshold and leave it to the sentencing judge’s discretion as to
which term of imprisonment should actually be imposed, the underlying
sentence spectrum is delineated by the states. Although this issue of
nonuniformity is very significant, presumably it could be solved by vesting
the immigration judge with a discretionary power.
Once a presumption of deportability has been established based on the
variable approach, the alien would have to rebut this presumption. The
alien’s rebuttal would take place during the removal hearing in which he
would demonstrate that he does not in fact pose an actual threat to public
safety, and/or that the stakes involved in his removal substantially outweigh
the threat that he poses to society.226 In order for the immigration judge to
make an equitable discretionary assessment regarding removal, the judge
would need to evaluate a list of factors in each case. In Matter of Marin,227
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) enumerated several factors that
immigration judges were to consider in granting an INA section 212(c)
waiver, a former type of discretionary relief.228 This proposal advocates the
adoption of these factors during the removal hearing.
The BIA in Marin held that the following factors were considered adverse
to a deportable alien’s 212(c) waiver application: the nature and underlying
circumstances of the removal ground; the alien’s criminal record and the
“nature, recency, and seriousness”229 of the crimes; any violations of United
States immigration laws; and “the presence of other evidence indicative of a
respondent’s bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident . . . .”230
The court held, however, that although one or more of these adverse factors
may be dispositive in determining whether to grant section 212(c) relief to
the alien, the presence of such factors would not preclude the alien from
presenting evidence that would merit a favorable exercise of discretion.231
Positive considerations included factors such as:
225. See generally Bennett, supra note 3.
226. It is important to note that aliens who are removed from the United States have already
served their sentences. Therefore, it is questionable whether the alien would ever pose a real threat to
society. This is true because if he has received a suspended sentence, or if he has been released, he has
already served a punishment commensurate with the crime that he committed. His suspended sentence,
or release from incarceration, is an acknowledgment by the criminal enforcement and judicial
authorities that his presence would not be socially harmful.
227. 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1978).
228. See supra note 51.
229. 16 I. & N. Dec. at 584.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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family ties within the United States, residence of long duration in this
country (particularly when the inception of such residence occurred
while the respondent was of young age), evidence of hardship to the
respondent and family if deportation occurs, service in this country’s
armed forces, a history of employment, the existence of property or
business ties, evidence of value and service to the community, proof
of a genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other
evidence attesting to a respondent’s good character (e.g., affidavits of
support from family, friends, and responsible community
representatives).232
Aside from these favorable considerations, if the purpose of the
discretionary test is to alleviate the possibility of trivial crimes being
considered grounds for removal, the alien must be given the opportunity to
demonstrate that his crime-related removal grounds are not considered as
severe in other states.233 He could do this by demonstrating how his state’s
criminal code differs from the penal provisions in other jurisdictions.
Moreover, he could present other sources that support his contention, such as
the Model Penal Code. The policy behind adopting this test in the removal
determination context is the same as that expressed by the BIA in Marin; by
weighing “the adverse factors evidencing an alien’s undesirability as a
permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented on
his behalf,”234 the immigration judge could determine what is in the best
interests of both the United States and the alien.235 This balancing test at the
removal hearing level would preserve relief without the requirements of
statutory eligibility under the current system.236
Finally, aside from establishing new criteria to determine a presumption
of deportability and preserving discretionary relief via a balancing test at the
removal level, this proposal advocates the restoration of judicial review to the
removal process. Judicial review of removal decisions is necessary if the
system is going to remain true to its objectives of flexibility and fairness. In
light of the balancing approach adopted at the removal hearing level, judicial
review would necessarily be quite narrow in scope as it would be limited to
232. Id. at 584-85.
233. See supra note 9.
234. 16 I. & N. Dec. at 584.
235. Id.
236. This discretionary test is not like the others enumerated in Part III.B. See LEGOMSKY, supra
note 8, at 532. Although those provisions are in the form of “[i]f A, B, and C, then the Attorney
General may do X,” id., this balancing test does not mandate preliminary eligibility requirements
before the immigration judge can assert his discretion. Such a test is similar to the procedure at work in
New Zealand. Id. at 533.
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an abuse of discretion standard.
This common sense removal system would ensure that only serious
criminal aliens whose continued presence in the United States would
jeopardize the public’s safety and welfare are removed. Moreover, it would
guarantee that the high stakes involved in the alien’s removal237 would be
taken into consideration via the balancing test during the removal hearing
and the alien’s opportunity for subsequent judicial review.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current crime-related removal system is not sufficiently tailored to
accommodate Congress’s objective of promoting public welfare and safety.
Congress’s “fixed rules” approach mandates the application of a rigid system
that reaches far beyond true criminal aliens and targets those who commit
only minor crimes as well.238 An ideal crime-related removal system would
abandon the notion that removal is an acceptable solution to alleviate alien
criminal activity. It would recognize that removal is too harsh a consequence
for aliens who have either committed minor crimes, or have committed more
serious offenses, but have established substantial roots in the United States.
Congress’s current fixed rules formulating the crime-related removal system
represent significant fine print caveats to Emma Lazarus’ poem engraved on
the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty.239 The new system outlined in this Note
replaces the fine print with a common sense approach.
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